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Dr. Wilson adds:

I defined intelligence as the speed
and extent of learning performance
over a wide range of tasks.
Inso
far as possible, the rank ordering
was based in part on actual experi
ments conducted on learning abili
ty.
In those cases where such
studies have not been made, I re
lied on the "encephalization in
dex, " which measures the size of
the brain relative to that of the
body as a whole and has been shown
to be roughly correlated with in
telligence.
Although I believe
that my rank ordering is relatively
sound, much more research is needed
in this field of zoology, and chan
ges in position can easily occur,
especially near the bottom of the
list of 10.[1]

There are certain views being advanced
by academicians that
are relevant to how
we, as a society, relate to and treat animals
and Nature.
As will be shown, these views
give support to the bio-politics of animal
and
Nature exploitation and,
therefore,
should .be challenged on ethical as well as
scientific grounds.
One view that is being advanced is that
humans are superior to other animals.
Those
who adhere to such a belief may then be
incapable of ethically objective and respon
sible action toward animals, because they
perceive animals as being inferior.
With
this preconceived notion that humans are
superior (and that some animal species are
more or less superior to others) the ethical
ly objective principle of giving animals
equal and fair consideration-~which is a
basic premise of animal rights philosophy--is
anathema.

It should be pointed out, however, that
"speed and extent of learning perfonnance
over a wide range of tasks" and the "ence
phalization index" are arbitrary, not abso
lute, indices of intelligence. comparing the
learning performance and brain size relative
to that of the body of different species sets
up absolute differences between species. And
when a hierarchy is drawn up, a further er
roneous inference is made, namely that of
superiority.

In apparent support of this view, Har
vard University"sociobiologist" and science
popularizer Edward o. Wilson has constructed
a list of the ten most intelligent animals:

1.

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

7.

8.
9.
10.

Chimpanzee (two species)
Gorilla
Orangutan
Baboon (seven species, includ
ing drill and mandrill)
Gibbon (seven species)
Monkey (many species, especial
ly macaques, the patas, and
the Celebes black ape)
Smaller toothed whale (several
species,
especially
killer
whale)
Dolphin (many of the approxi
mately 80 species)
Elephant (two species)
Pig.

This "speciesist thinking" is a reflec
tion of our own values, especially of our
valuing intelligence as some special virtue.
Such valuation can distort our perceptions of
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ority over the animal kingdom as some irrefutable truth. His writings have wide public
appeal and have been lauded by educators,
though ob'1er philosophers generally ignore
his pontifications.

other animals and influence how we treat them
and value them in and for themselves.
A
"dumb beast," low in the sapience or I.Q.
hierarchy, would not be accorded the same
respect as a more intelligent species (i.e.,
one "more hlIDlaIl" in some respect).
Yet, all
animals should be respected equally, since
they are all sentient, having the capacity to
feel and to suffer.

In many of his writings, he has argued
that rationality is the highest virtue and
that since humans are the only truly rational
beings on Earth, they are superior to the
rest of creation, and, consequently, there is
nothing morally wrong in exploiting animals.

While comparing different species is one
avenue to understanding evolution, adaptation, and the structure and function of living things, making comparisons on the basis
of biased, hlIDlaIl-centered values can have
pernicious ramifications.
Any hierarchy (of
superior-inferior, greater-lesser) sets up a
false view of reality, and when it is imposed
upon the animal kingdom, it can break the
circle

of compassion within which all

tures should be regarded and
equal reverence and respect.

treated

In his most recent popular book, Ten
Philosophical Mistakes, he supports the views
of Thomas Aquinas, who derived his philosophy
from Aristotle and incorporated it
into
Christian theology, reasoning, for example,
that only rational beings (Le., humans) have
immortal souls.
Animals are, therefore,
inferior.
So, naturally, Adler is critical
of Charles Darwin (who was cognizant of animals' emotions and was concerned about their
widespread mistreatment, especially by vivisectors) for classifying hlIDlaIls as animals.
Professor Adler contends that hlIDlaIls alone
can conceive of right and wrong.
Thus, humans are a superior kind of being, capable of
moral responsibility and ethical conduct.
However, we, unlike animals, have the power
of free-will to act irrmorally and unethical-

creawith

That Professor Wilson listed the chimp3IlZee first and not HalD sapiens is his
first biological error.
But it is, I believe, a politically coercive, if not unconscious, omission.
It would seem by this
omission that Wilson would have us believe
that we are so superior to all other animals
that we do not rank with them.
Yet, are we
not, along with the gorilla and orangutan,
less intelligently adapted to life in the
water than a dolphin (which he ranks eighth)?
And is not a tenth-ranking pig more intelligent at being a pig, and living in its own
particular environmental niche, than a dolphin or a chimpanzee could ever be?

ly, so does this not make us "inferior" to
other animals? That it is in our best interests to be morally right and ethically responsible is a sign of enlightened selfinterest, not of superiority over the animal
kingdom.
It is worth noting that Adler
stresses the difference in sapience of hlIDlaIls
over animals that makes us superior, rather
than emphasizing (as did Darwin) the similarities in sentience--in emotional reactions
and feelings--that make us feel kinship and
compassion rather than superiority.

What is Professor Wilson doing?
other
biologists before him placed Negro and European and Asian peasant races beneath their
white, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant ideal of superiority and hlIDlaIl perfection. With such an
arrogant attitude of patriarchal supremacy
over others and the rest of creation, no
ethical decision could be objective and unbiased.
All moral choices would be decided
upon by sane arbitrary consensus of reality
and of our supreme place in Nature that would
be ultimately self-serving.
Wilson's animal
I.Q. hierarchy sets up the pyramid of power.
Is it not as "speciesist" as his predecessor
bio-politicians were racist?

It should be emphasized that many opponents of animal rights philosophy have argued
that only hlIDlaIls can have rights because only
hlIDlaIls can act as moral agents. Non-rational
animals having no sense of right or wrong,
cannot, therefore, have rights.
But since
babies and comatose patients, who are neither
rational nor capable of being moral agents,
have rights because they are recognized as
"moral objects," it is illogical not to regard animals also as objects of moral concern
with interests and, therefore, as rightsholders. Adler's thinking leads to the opposite
conclusion,
denying animals
their

Then there is philosopher Mortimer Adler, whose books, like biologist Wilson's,
present the speciesist view of human superiBEIWEEN THE SPECIES
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totally exclude continuity.

rights.

But even if humans, with their cognitive,
linguistic and technological abilities represent a discontinuity in Nature, and differ in
kind rather than in degree fran animals as
Adler proposes (and one may wonder about his
llDtives for doing so), we do know that in
terms of sentience, the capacity to feel and
to suffer, that animals do not differ significantly fran us in kind.
.Adler focuses his
argument on differences in sapience, which
reflects the basically rational materialism
of his Aristotelean, human-centered philosophy.
By ignoring animal sentience, as well
as recognition of their interests, he condones their exploitation on the basis of our
apparently superior intellect.
Adler justifies differential treatment by concluding
that animals are neither rational nor llDral.

It is also significant and disturbing
that in his latest book, Adler endorses the
Thomistic view (derived fran Aristotle) that
ideas are basic concepts by which we understand experiences and reality as we perceive
it.
These basic concepts are the fOW1dation
of W1iversal truths, which are immutable, he
insists.
Ethically blind to the biased,
hurran-centered worldview that certain basic
concepts and beliefs might support, it is to
be expected that if the consensus holds that
other animals are inferior to us, then it
must be an inmutable truth.

The differences in kind between humans
and animals are deeply entrenched in religious and philosophical beliefs (not universal, illlllUtable truths) that humans and humans
alone are made in God's image, that humans
are a special creation, that only humans have
i.rnroortal souls.
Since the only proven difference is in our intellective, technological, and linguistic abilities, these differen-
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ces, when weighed against the many similarities that we share anatanically, physiologically, biochemically, and ellDtionally with
animals are insufficient to justify on llDral
grounds our calling animals mere "things" and
treating them accordingly.
I t is simply a
question of pure expediency, since I believe
that there are no llDrally relevant differences between us and animals to permit us to
exploit them as "things," purely as a means
to satisfy human ends.

1979

:lons.

Adler's philosophy supports
Wilson's
biology, the fusion of which I would term
"biological fascism." In an earlier book,
The Difference of Man and the Difference It
Makes, Adler argues that if there is a significant difference in kind, rather than in
degree, between hurrans and animals (which has
not yet been proven or W1ambiguously agreed
upon), then our not giving animals equal and
fair consideration is ethically tenable.
He
notes that

Darwin must have understcxxl this dilemma, for he wrote "We are not superior" on his
hand as a daily reminder.[2] That we are
part of the one life and of a unified field
shatters the notion of biological, evolutionary, and other hierarchies that are constructs derived not fran universal and inmutable truths but fran our own self-centered,
superior, and daninionistic attitude toward
animals and the rest of God's creation.

[Hence] a single all-embracing continuum in nature need not exclude
all differences.
It allows for
differences in degree and for superficial differences in kind.
It
excludes only radical differences
in kind; for, if such exist, there
is an underlying discontinuity in
nature.
Nor does a hierarchy of
forms in nature (involving, as it
does, radical differences in kind)

In addition to the potentially negative
bio-political implications of the above biological and philosopucal views, there is a
theological view, gaining popularity allDngst
scientists and humanists alike, that could
5

BEIWEEN THE SPECIES

break Christianity fran the salvafic and
hierarchical cosmology of an annipotent and
anthrop:xnorphic divinity.
Indeed, he emphasized the creative, rather than salvafic, and
while his mysticism was ultimately anthropocentric, his concept of divinity was closer
to Whitehead's process thinking (and to Spinoza's and Einstein's concept of divinity)
than to the church of Rane' s anthrop:xnorphic
view of God. Hence his works were suppressed
by the Catholic authority of Papal decree for
many years.
(He was also challenging the
church's patriarchal structure and entire
cosmology. )

lead to a widespread acceptance of the extinction of the animal kingdan as being as
natural and inevitable as evolution itself.
Jesuit scientist and renowned theologian .
Pierre Teilhard de Chardin speaks of the
"haninisation" of Earth. In other words, the
world of Nature and the animal kingdan are
taken over by HallO sapiens and transfonned
(by what he calls "techno-involution," Le.,
via scientific-technological
innovations).
this he considered a natural consequence of
the mutation in consciousness (reflective
awareness) that makes us the special creation
that we are.
In his book Man's Place in Nature,
accepts the industrialization of Nature
natural and inevitable:

Teilhard stopped short of pantheism when
he saw "Christo-genesis"--the spiritual awakening of Christ-consciousness--as the final
point in human evolution (as Hom::> sapiens) •
And his view was ultimately hierarchical,
since he put people at the top of the evolutionary process.

he
as

We must realize that the continually greater industrialisation of the
earth is simply the h1.nllCill-collective fonn of a universal process of
vitalisation which, in this as in
all other cases, can only lead, if
we knO\v the right way in which to

Pantheism may then be the next religious
perspective, but there may soon be nothing
left of Nature to revere, if we continue to
neglect and destroy the biosphere. Had Teilhard realized how critical the state of the
biosphere already was when he was elaborating
his cosmology (but few people were aware in
the 1950's and early 1960's) and had he not
such a naive faith in scientific and technological progress (as most people had in the
relief and optimism in those two post-World
War II decades), then he might not have excluded concern for Nature and the rest of
creation. He did not see how "techno-involution"--scientific and technological
"progress"--could destroy the biosphere.
He saw
it as the interface between the biosphere and
the evolving "noosphere" (which is difficult
to define simply but might be envisioned as a
matrix of h1.nllCill consciousness, communication,
power, and control that envelops the biosphere). Teilhard would agree that without a
biosphere, there can be no noosphere and that

approach it, to interiorisation and
freedan.
His lack of critical analysis of the adverse
consequences
of the industrialization of
earth, and of articulating "the right way in
which to approach it," would surely be forthcoming today i f he had lived and extended his
philosophy in the light of today's environmental awareness.
His faith in h1.nllCill progress as being ultimately self-correcting and
stabilizing though foresight and choice may
be an optimist's dream.
His vision was not
grounded in the reality of h1.nllCill destructiveness of the biosphere, for he saw the destruction of stable lands as the one serious
------threat to h1.nllCill progress which would likely
be temporary and corrected by technological
innovation.
The spiritual and econanic consequences of destroying Nature or of transforming the biosphere into an industrial
system for our exclusive h1.nllCill use are not
considered.

a destructive technology would destroy both.
Father Thanas Berry, of the Riverdale Center
for Religious Studies, [3] has written several
treatises to help put Teilhardianism into its
proper contemporary setting.

Teilhard de Chardin has been rightly
criticized by many philosophers, conservationists, and others for not incorporating
concern for the biosphere as a living system
and concern for species other than his own.
I greatly respect his work, however, and join
others in acknowledging that he has helped
BEI'WEEN THE SPECIES

Scientists and others who are attracted
to Teilhard 's cosmology have found it helpful, I believe, in alleviating their consciences over the armihilation of the biosphere and the present holocaust of the animal kingdan.
All this is rationalized as
6

is the bio-politics of contemporary science,
philosofhY, and theology whose worldview is
self-serving and anthropocentric--and thus
lacking in scholarly objectivity and ethical
sensibility. Educators, scientists, philosofhers, and others need to be aware of the
subtle and insidious ramifications of the
worldview espoused by those whose attitude
toward animals and Nature is neither democratic nor egalitarian.
Rather, it can lead
to the bio-politics of fascism and imperialism under the guise of academia's infallible
wisdom and scholarly facade of scientific
objectivity and truthfulness.

being a natural consequence of evolution-horninisation--so it doesn't matter.
From
this perspective,
to worry about saving
wolves and snow leopards is as silly today as
it would have been stupid for sane sentimental aliens to have saved the dinosaurs from
extinction.
(And had they done so, then we
humans would not exist!) Their extinction is
in the natural scheme.
But since Teilhard
never discussed the threatened status of the
biosfhere and the ani-mal kingdom and its
ethical and evolutionary implications, it is
hardly right to conclude that his philosofhY
accepts, or considers, natural the destruction of Nature--the biosfhere.
(And under
"destruction" I include loss of species,
genetic diversity, habitats, ecosystems, and
resources and poisoning of the entire planetary ecosystem.)
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Because of his faith in evolution/God,
he did not doubt that only good would arise
from the transformation of the biosfhere by
technology and hanonisation.
He died too
soon, but as I said, he did at least turn the
church's attention away from its emphasis on
world-negating salvation, toward recognition
of the divine mystery that evolutionary biology reveals.
A world-affirming emfhasis
upon the creative process rather than upon
salvation is now being encouraged by Father
Berry and others.
In essence,
this is a
return to Nature, not to pantheism, but at
least toward a reverence for the Earth and
God's creations.

Do they matter?
An exciting new awareness is
unfolding- ahout our relationship
with animals and the rest of the
natural world. Read ahollt it in
THE ANIMALS' AGENDA.

In conclusion,
I have endeavored to
dem::mstrate, by selecting sane of the ideas
of contemporary thinkers in the fields of
biology, philosophy, and theology, how these
disciplines can be used to alienate people
from animals and Nature.
This alienation
process, whereby people are led to believe
that they are superior to animals and that
there is no moral or ethical issue in the
wholesale exploitation of animals and nature,

NAME

_
_

~,.REET

CITY

7

STATE _ _ ZIP

_

BElWEEN' THE SPECIES

